Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2002

Feminism and International Law: An Opportunity for
Transformation
Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks
Georgetown University Law Center, rosa.brooks@law.georgetown.edu

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1132
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2310042

14 Yale J.L. & Feminism 345-361 (2002)
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, International Law
Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons

Feminism and International Law: An Opportunity
for Transformation
Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks •

I. A MAN'S WORLD?

On September 11, 2001, the world collided with the United States, forcing
Americans to remember that although we may sometimes prefer to ignore the
rage and pain of those who live far away, we have no guarantees that we will
be ignored in return. The long-term impact of September 11 on U.S.
government policy is still far from clear: the U.S. may ultimately become more
multi-lateral, or we may merely become more imperialist. Regardless of how
we move forward, however, it has become clear that isolationism is no longer
possible in today's globally interconnected world, and international issues in
both politics and law are taking on ever-increasing importance.
This could have been said even before September 11, of course: from the
Gulf War to the Kosovo air campaign, from NAFT A 1 to the World Bank, the
past decade has seen the U.S. drawn into a wide range of international alliances
and adventures. Correspondingly, more and more lawyers have found
themselves working on international issues, whether these are international
business transactions or international human rights law cases. Law schools
have responded by increasing course offerings in these areas, and students have
eagerly signed up for international classes and projects.
Given this, you would expect to find both women and men populating the
world of international law. Nonetheless, if you look for the women in
international law and policy, you look almost in vain. Despite Madeleine
Albright's much-heralded presence on the State Department's Seventh Floor
during the last half of the Clinton Administration, and Condoleezza Rice's role
as Bush's National Security Advisor, the world of international law and foreign
policy remains very much a male world. Several years ago, I served as a senior
advisor at the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
• Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks is Associate Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of
Law. She also serves on the Board of Directors of Amnesty International USA, and is the former Acting
Director of Yale Law School's Schell Center for International Human Rights.
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Labor; at State Department meetings, I was almost always one of a handful of
women in a room full of men. My female friends at the State Department and
the Pentagon today report that women remain scarce once you move beyond
secretarial positions.
Women are similarly absent from the highest ranks of the United Nations,
NATO/ the OSCE, 3 and other influential international and regional
4
organizations. And as even a quick document search on Lexis or Westlaw
demonstrates, women are equally few and far between as authors of articles on
international law. A search of law school catalogues shows the same shortage
of women in the ranks of international law faculty.
Why is this still true, when international issues are of ever-increasing
importance? Thinking in particular about international law, perhaps it is
because the traditional subjects of international law appear, at first glance at
least, to have very little to do with the immediate concerns of women.
International law has historically looked at relations between states, at issues of
sovereignty, international security, territorial integrity, and so on. These
rarified concerns may seem to have little to do with women's lived experiences,
little to do with issues of "traditional" concern to feminist legal scholars:
gender relations, reproductive rights, family law, domestic violence, property,
workplace equality, harassment, sexual violence. The domain of international
Jaw may strike many feminists as largely irrelevant to these compelling
domestic concerns.
To the minimal extent that women have entered the male domain of
international law and policy, they are often to be found clustered in its "softer"
comers, where you find the more "feminine," "human interest" subjects such as
refugee Jaw and human rights law. When I was at the State Department,
meetings about transnational economic policy or international security involved
few women, but meetings about purely "humanitarian" issues often reversed
the usual male-female ratios; the men, busily planning air wars and
contemplating the future of"failed" states, were content to leave to their female
colleagues the "softer" and less appealing problems of how to shelter and feed
the thousands of refugees who fled those air wars and failed states.
Even in the realm of international human rights and humanitarian law,
however, there are still few women, in absolute terms. The top officers of the
largest U.S.-based human rights NGOs are all men, for instance; it is only when
you get to the women's rights and children's rights divisions of these NGOs
that leadership positions are consistently filled by women.

2. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
3. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
4. See. e.g., Press Briefing by Rosario Green, UN Assistant Secretary-General, 16 March 1996;
UN, WOMEN IN POLITICS AND DECISION-MAKING IN THE LATE TwENTIETH CENTURY: A UNITED
NATIONS STUDY (1992).
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In part, this may be because international human rights law has historically
reified civil and political rights at the expense of social, economic and cultural
rights. Here too, although civil and political rights are of pressing concern to
political elites all the world over, they may be of distinctly lesser concern to
most of the world's three billion women, for whom the daily struggle to feed a
family is of more urgent interest than freedom of the press. And international
humanitarian law is, to a significant extent, about how soldiers should treat
other soldiers in the context of armed conflict. Until quite recently, the fate of
women in times of armed conflict received only passing attention in
international humanitarian law.
Little wonder, then, that few women have troubled to enter the man's
world of international law. International law seems to have very little to say to
women.
But if international law appears to have little relevance to us as women,
that is precisely why we-as feminists-must engage with it, far more than we
have done in the past. Although it may not be readily apparent, international
law can and does oppress and injure women. At the same time, international
law (and particularly human rights law) has a transformative potential that we
ignore at our peril.
In this essay, I want to outline briefly both some of the ways in which the
assumptions and categories of international law can be damaging to women,
and also some of the ways in which creative feminists could use international
law to transform both international policy and the domestic political and legal
discourse. In the wake of September 11, a robust feminist engagement with
international law and policy is more urgent than ever before.
II. MAPPING THE SILENCES
I have already spoken briefly about a few of the ways in which
international law (and even human rights law) might seem initially to have little
to say on subjects important to women. This should not lead us to decide that
international law is irrelevant to women, however, for to a significant degree,
the ways in which international law oppresses and injures women are
coextensive with the ways in which international law is silent on many of the
subjects most obviously central to women. Our project, as feminists, must in
large part be to map the silences of international law, and fill those silences
5
with our own voices. In a recently published book, Hilary Charlesworth and
Christine Chinkin have exhaustively discussed the many "silences" of
international law, and I would refer interested readers to that excellent book for

5. HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE (HINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

(2000).
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a thorough and thought-provoking analysis. I will outline just a few of these
"silences" in this essay.
Take, first, international law's historic insistence that it is the state, and
only the state, that is the subject of international law. To the traditionalist,
national law governs the relations between individuals within the state, while
international law governs the relations between states. Women have rarely
been heads of state, of course, 6 so this exclusive focus on state relations renders
women-and, for that matter, most other individual humans-more or less
invisible from the Olympian perspective of international law.
Until quite recently, international law viewed the state as a black box into
which international law could not see-and did not wish to see. International
law's proper focus was order between states, not justice within them. In the
past fifty years, this perspective has come under siege by the emerging field of
human rights law, which has insisted that sovereignty has its limits, and at least
some of what states do within their own borders is properly of concern to the
community of nations as a whole. After the Holocaust, few scholars were
willing anymore to accept an international legal order in which the mass
killings of millions of citizens could be seen as solely the concern of their
murderous state.
Nonetheless, if human rights law has succeeded in replacing the old
international law model of the sovereign state as black box with a somewhat
more translucent model of the state, into which other nations may legitimately
peer, human rights law has continued in other ways to insist on the state's
centrality. For most of the past fifty years, human rights law has concerned
itself solely with the question of what state agents may legitimately do to the
people within their state's borders. State action has been the sine qua non of
human rights law violations, just as for the most part state action was the sine
qua non in domestic civil rights cases. If security forces torture political
dissidents, or a state media regulatory board arbitrarily shuts down opposition
newspapers, we have "clear" cases of human rights law violations.
But in this traditional understanding of human rights law, if thousands of
men systematically beat or rape thousands of women, this is not a human rights
abuse, unless the men are state agents acting on the orders of the state. If the
men are merely "traditional" fathers or husbands, using age-old methods of
maintaining their domestic authority, we have, perhaps, a regrettable state of
affairs, but no human rights law violation. Similarly, if thousands of women
and girls are trafficked into sexual or domestic near-slavery, we have no human
rights law violation, unless the trafficking is carried out by state agents acting
in their official capacity.

6. In 2000, there were only nine female heads of state. Women similarly made up only 8 percent of
cabinet ministers and II percent of parliamentarians worldwide. See THE WORLD'S WOMEN: TRENDS
AND STATISTICS 2000, UN Publication ST/ESNSTA T/SER.K/WWW/16 (May 2000).
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Thus, international law's insistence on the centrality of the state-an
insistence that even human rights law left largely unchallenged until quite
recently-has had the effect of defining out of existence many of the most
prevalent forms of female injury and oppression. Domestic violence, sexual
trafficking, and other forms of discrimination mar the lives of millions of
women around the globe, but international law's blindness to violence that
doesn't involve state action has meant that such abuses have, for years, been
largely invisible-or, at any rate, relegated to the domain of national criminal
law, rather than international human rights law. 7 (It will not escape the
feminist scholar that this distinction between national and international law
maps almost precisely onto equally problematic domestic law distinctions
between the private and the public realms of behavior).
Indeed, the very understanding of what constitutes a "state" is a highly
gendered understanding. International law requires four minimal criteria to be
met before recognizing the existence of a "state": a state must have a
permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter
into relations with other states. 8 These are, of course, requirements that are
arbitrary, and increasingly so in this more global era: for instance, why must a
group of people occupy a defined territory before they are permitted a state,
given that electronic communications may make physical location less
important than ever before?
All categories are inevitably somewhat arbitrary, but in the case of the
definition of the state, the particular requirements for state recognition may
injure women more than they injure men. In many refugee populations, for
instance, women outnumber men, and regardless of the sex ratios, women
refugees are generally far more vulnerable to attack, starvation and abuse than
are male refugees. 9 Refugees are, by definition, people who have fled their
state of origin, usually because their state of origin is either persecuting them or
failing to protect them. 10 But with no state to protect them, and virtually no
ability to form a new state, refugee populations slip between the cracks of
international law, receiving no formal recognition. Since often more women
than men find themselves in this situation, in some regions far more women

7. See generally Women "s Human Rights: Human Rights Developments, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
WORLD REPORT 200 I, available at http://www.hrw.org/women/reports.php.
8. See 3RD REsTATEMENT ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ( 1987); Montevideo Convention on the Rights
and Duties of States, Dec. 26, !933, U.N.T.S.
9. See 2001 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES POPULATION STATISTICS
(Provisional), available at hllp:llwww.unhcr.ch/cgi-binltexislvtxlhome?page=statistics.
I 0. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. I, reprinted in OFFICE OF
THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES-UNHCR, COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENTS CONCERNING REFUGEES (2d ed. 1979) (defining a refugee as "A person who is outside
his/her country of nationality or habitual residence; has a well-founded fear of persecution because of
his/her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion; and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself/herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for fear
of persecution.").
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than men find themselves effectively disenfranchised within the international
system.
Similarly, the international law understanding of what constitutes a state
far predates the human rights revolution, and is entirely neutral with regard to
how a state conducts itself. Thus, the Vatican qualifies as a state under
international law (and is a Member State of the United Nations) even though it
systematically excludes women from high-level state decision-making.
Similarly, Kuwait is a state with full UN voting rights, even though it denies
the vote to women within its own borders.
Although today international law theoretically includes strong norms
against at least such egregious forms of gender discrimination, 11 there is no
international law mechanism for denying a state the right to participate fully in
the international system on the grounds of gender discrimination. 12 As long as
a state maintains its defined territory, permanent population, and some form of
government with the capacity to engage in relations with other states, its
statehood is more or less unassailable within international law. Since many UN
and other international forums operate on a consensus basis, even a single state
can often prevent or hold up a decision it doesn't like, giving even those states
which engage in systematic and de jure discrimination against women the
ability to block implementation of international programs they dislike.
Some scholars have noted that even the very notion of the state is
gendered. To fulfill the intemationallaw requirements for effective statehood,
an entity must be bounded and self-determined, rather than fluid and porous:
that is, like the male body, as conceptualized in the domestic legal discourse,
rather than the female body (soft, boundary-less, subject to "invasion" by the
male body). Invasion of one state by another is a violation of international law,
and the invaded state is often conceptualized as "female" relative to the
aggressive, masculine invader. Thus Belgium, invaded by Germany during
World War One, was conceptualized as vulnerable and feminine (and thus in
danger of losing its claim to independent statehood; Kuwait was similarly
"feminized" in relation to Iraq when it failed to defend its borders). 13
Another example of the ways in which international law's silences can
harm women lies in the easy assumption, common still even in human rights
law, that "maleness" is the norm, and progress in gender equity will come only
when women are treated "the same" as men. This sort of assumption has been
challenged for several decades in the domestic legal discourse, but it goes
relatively unremarked upon in the international human rights law discourse.
II. See Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Nov. I,
1991 (hereinafter CEDA W), available at http://www.un.orglwomenwatchldaw/cedawlratifica.htm
("specialized" convention ratified by over ninety percent of the world's states).
12. Much more attention is given to race discrimination, e.g., apartheid.
13. See, e.g., J.A. Ticknor, Inadequate Providers? A Gendered Analysis of States and Security, in
THE STATE IN TRANSITION 129, 133 (Joseph A. Camilleri et al. eds., 1995).
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Take a close look at the Universal Declaration of Human Rights--or even,
more recently, at The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDA W)--and you see a conception of
14
equality that would not have seemed odd at Seneca Falls in 1848 : the goal for
women is "equality," to have access to education, jobs, and political power on
the same basis as men.
To give a typical example, CEDAW calls on states to ensure that women
and men are given "the same conditions for career and vocational guidance
[and] for access to studies ... this equality shall be ensured in preschool,
general, technical, professional and higher technical education, as well as in all
types of vocational training .... " 15 To feminists whose outlook has been
informed by Carol Gilligan or Catharine MacKinnon, the brand of feminism
reflected in such provisions is apt to seem somewhat simplistic. Why, after all,
should women want the very same thing men already have? Women face
different reproductive choices and different social constraints than do men. Is
the male standard the right standard for women? For that matter, is the male
standard the right standard for men? Yet in CEDAW we see no hint that there is
anything fundamentally wrong, or even questionable, in the way social and
political relations and structures are organized within the state (much less, of
course, do we see any hint that the state itself is not the most reliable guarantor
of women's rights, or that the very conception of the state is arbitrary and
problematic). CEDAW suggests that nothing need be changed except
stereotypes and formal barriers to access: just let the women in, and that's that.
CEDA W and other human rights conventions thus take it for granted that
the rights that "matter" most are precisely the rights that have, historically,
mattered most to male political elites: that is, civil and political rights. For
women, of course, such civil and political rights have often seemed impossible
to separate cleanly from social, economic, and cultural rights-and, what's
more, civil and political rights have often seemed like distinctly lower
priorities. If your daily struggle involves keeping your children from starving
or being killed or maimed in the fields, the factories, or the army, freedom of
the press is likely to be of academic interest, at best. Yet the international
community-human rights law. groups included--<:ontinues to resist giving
social and economic rights equal standing with civil and political rights. 16
A major part of the feminist project, as I have said, must be to point out
those assumptions of international law that allow women's concerns to be

14. In 1848, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott called the first U.S. conference on women's
rights in Seneca Falls, New York. The resulting Seneca Falls Declaration was a classic call for women's
formal equality.
15. CEDA W, supra note I I, at art. I O(a).
16. Notably, Amnesty International, the world's largest human rights organization, recently
changed its mandate to permit limited work on social, economic and cultural rights in addition to civil
and political rights.
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dismissed as trivial. We need to map the silences, and fill them. Perhaps better
still, we need to alter the discourse entirely. Just as, in the domestic realm,
feminist scholars have challenged the artificial and damaging ways in which
the distinction between the public and the private has been drawn, so should we
be challenging the way international law has drawn certain distinctions
between, for instance, "international" and "national". In recent years, feminist
scholars and activists have made tremendous strides in this direction. Thanks
to the work of women such as Hilary Charlesworth, 17 Christine Chinkin, 18
20
Rhonda Copelon, 19 Dorothy Thomas, and many, many others, women have
begun to break into international law, and they have brought to it the same
feminist clarity of vision that has begun to transform the domestic legal
discourse. Women have insisted, for instance, that trafficking and violence
against women must be viewed as proper subjects for international human
rights and humanitarian law: After all, widespread domestic violence is
possible only when state structures encourage, tolerate, or consistently fail to
remedy it.
Rape of women during armed conflicts only occurs when
commanders encourage it, or choose not to prohibit it or punish men who
engage in it. Trafficking in women is possible only when state agents refuse to
make preventing it a priority and refuse to engage in the collaborative
international efforts necessary to stamp it out. 21 If we use a more nuanced and
expanded definition of state action-one that recognizes that willful blindness
or deliberate inaction is just as much a state choice-many injuries that affect
women in particular suddenly appear on our maps with startling clarity.
As a result of careful criticism and imaginative lobbying by women's
human rights advocates, the nature of international human rights and
humanitarian law is beginning to change, albeit slowly. The criminal tribunals
on Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia have acknowledged that rape can be an
aspect of genocide, for instance, 22 and the statute of the International Criminal
Court acknowledges concerns previously marginalized as "women's issues" to
an unprecedented degree.Z 3 Similarly, both human rights organizations and
international organizations such as the UN are gradually beginning to give
greater priority to social and economic rights and the role of non-state actors,

17. Supra note 5.
18. Supra note 6.
19. Professor of Law and Director of the International Women's Human Rights Law Clinic
(IWHR) at the City University of New York School of Law, and a pioneer in the field of women's
human rights.
20. The first director of the Human Rights Watch Women's Rights Project.
21. It is worsened when women who are "trafficked" for sexual purposes are treated as criminals
rather than as victims.
22. See. e.g., Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Case
No. I.C.T.R.-96-4-T (finding that a communal leader's encouragement of rape and sexual abuse of Tutsi
women was an aspects of genocide in the context of Rwanda).
23. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. NCONF.183/9 (1998),
available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/.
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whether they are armed rebel groups, NGOs, criminal gangs, or multinational
corporations.
Ill. A

FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW?
So far, I have been giving what we might call a "first phase" feminist
critique: pointing out the ways in which international institutions and
international legal categories tend to exclude women and the issues of most
concern to women. Naturally, this first phase critique of international lawand its subcategories, human rights and humanitarian law-has already
generated a "critique of the critique" by some legal scholars. To begin with,
critics argue, the first phase feminist critique of international law and human
rights takes little account of the critique of the very concept of rights, 24 a
critique that has shaken the domestic legal discourse to its foundations (if it can
be said to have any solid foundations). Needless to say, the feminist/crit/postmodem critique of rights is as applicable to the international sphere as it is to
the domestic sphere; 25 it is pre-figured, perhaps, by feminist questions about the
centrality of civil and political rights in international human rights law, but its
full implications were not teased out in the first phase feminist critique. 26
Just as some scholars have questioned a rights-based approach, in recent
years some feminists
have begun to raise
questions
about
essentialist/universalist approaches in the context of international law.
Influenced by the work of Carol Gilligan and others, feminists have long
criticized both domestic and international civil and human rights documents
that take it for granted that maleness is the norm 27-but, for example, the "first
phase" feminist critique of CEDA W itself assumes that there is in fact
something we can refer to as "maleness," and that it is opposed by something
we might call "femaleness." The second phase critique asks whether there is
really any such thing as "femaleness. " 28 Is there a distinct and uncontested
"women's perspective" that is different from a "male perspective," and if so, is
that women's perspective simple to identify and define?
"Second phase" critics note that even within elite Western feminist
scholarly circles, one woman's bread is another woman's poison. Surely, then,
it is a form of arrogance to insist that the world's three billion women have a
24. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights. 62 TEX. L. REv. 1363 (1984); Radika
Coomaraswamy, To Bellow Like a Cow: Women, Ethnicity, and the Discourse of Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS OF WOMEN (R.Cook ed., 1994).
25. Feminist scholars have since corrected this. See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin
& Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613 (1991 ).
26. See Karen Engle, International Human Rights and Feminism: Where Discourses Meet 13
MICH. J.1NT'L L. 317 (1992).
27. See, e.g., Robin West, Feminism, Critical Socinl Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59.
28. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods. 103 HARV. L. REv. 829 (1990).
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common perspective on such a highly problematized subject as "rights." Does
an illiterate women on a subsistence farm in rural Cameroon have anything
much in common with prostitute working in Thailand's sex industry, or a
Chicana laborer in New Mexico, or a female astrophysicist in Germany? And
what the about cross-cutting commitments to tribe, religion, ethnicity, or
community that many women may feel? If we wish to develop a conception of
"rights" that embraces the communal as well as the individual, "peoples" as
well as "people," how should feminist international lawyers respond to
Taliban-style "religious" restrictions on women? To Female Genital Mutilation
29
(FGM)? To Indian women's cults that reify suttee? To put it bluntly, can a
small group of privileged, first world women lawyers presume to say anything
at all about "women" as an international class?
IV. THE PROMISE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AS A
TRANSFORMA TIVE DISCOURSE

These questions are troubling. But that way, I would suggest, lies
madness, or at any rate a uniquely disabling form of post-modern paralysis.
Despite all the difficulties, I believe it is critical that we, as women-with all of
our similarities and all of our differences--engage in the international law
project. I believe, in particular, that universalist, liberal conceptions of human
rights have much to offer- that we can do quite a lot with the language of
human rights, however limited its vocabulary and incoherent its grammatical
rules.
Consider, to start, the range of problems women face around the world.
First, of course, women face direct abuses by state agents. Under many
repressive regimes, women are censored, detained, beaten, tortured,
imprisoned, executed, kidnapped, and so on. When states decide to cannibalize
their citizenry, they generally find women just as tasty as male victims.
Second, women around the world suffer from both de jure and de facto
discrimination. In some states, women are inferior to men as a matter of law;
they cannot inherit property, cannot obtain a divorce, cannot hold public office,
cannot receive the same education as men, are forbidden to enter certain
professions, are fined if they wear "improper" clothing, and can legally be
beaten or raped by their husbands. (The Taliban may be gone from
Afghanistan, but women in most parts of that troubled country find today that
they are still subject to numerous restrictions 30-as are women in many other
parts of the Islamic world). In many other states, the laws on the books are
gradually changing, but women still face widespread societal discrimination.
29. Suttee is defined as self-immolation following a husband's death.
30. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH BRIEFING PAPER, TAKING COVER: WOMEN IN POST-TALIBAN
AFGHANISTAN

(May 2002), available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/wrd/afghan-women-2k2.htm.
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They find it difficult to obtain jobs and promotions easily available to men,
they face mockery and harassment if they enter "male" professions, and they
face extreme social pressures to conform to traditional and confining
conceptions of proper female roles. 31
Third, women often face serious abuse at the hands of private actors, while
the state turns a blind eye. Women are beaten, raped, or virtually enslaved by
husbands or other male "heads of families," they are forced into particularly
dangerous jobs, they are sold into bonded labor or trafficked, often across
international borders, into domestic or sexual slavery. 32
Finally, in times of armed conflict, women are particularly victimized.
Women suffer when men abandon (or are forced, themselves, to abandon) the
home for the army, as women often face, alone, the task of feeding a family.
They must often flee from the conflict, and women and children comprise
three-fourths of the population of refugee and internally displaced persons'
camps. 33 In the camps, run by well-intentioned international agencies, women
may have little direct access to food, because relief agencies frequently
distribute food to "heads of households," often self-appointed men, who may
not bother to pass much on to the women or children. In an increasing number
of recent conflicts, women have been deliberately targeted by hostile forces,
and systematically subjected to rape and sexual torture. In other conflicts,
women and young girls have been systematically abducted and made to serve
as "wives" to male soldiers. 34
The point of this painful litany is not to numb, but to remind us that the
harms this world inflicts upon women are often not particularly subtle. In the
face of such overwhelming wrongs, the universalist human rights discourse has
been extraordinarily powerful, indeed transformative, for women around the
world.
The discourse of rights is not unassailable, and universalistic
conceptions of rights will never be unproblematic. Nonetheless, as Patricia
Williams has noted in the domestic context of race-based oppression, for the
oppressed, at least, talk of rights can be "deliciously empowering. . . . It is the
magic wand of visibility and invisibility, of inclusion and exclusion, of power
and no power." 35

31. For a comprehensive set of statistics and information on the status of women worldwide, see
THE WORLD'S WOMEN. supra note 6, especially Chapter 6 (Human Rights and Politics). For a
comprehensive overview of human rights abuses against women, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH GLOBAL REPORT ON WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS (1995).
32. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 31.
33. See. e.g., REFUGEE WATCH, CHRONICLES OF SUFFERINGS: REFUGEE WOMEN OF SOUTH ASIA
(June
2000);
Refugee
Watch,
No.
10
&
II
(July
2000),
available
at
http://www .safhr .org/contents331 O.html.
34. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE WAR WITHIN THEW AR: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN AND GIRLS IN EASTERN CONGO (2002).
35. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From Deconstructed Rights. 22
HARV. C.R.-C. L. L. REV. 401 (1987).
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Williams and others have already made this observation more eloquently
than I can, so I will not belabor the argument here. But I do want to point out
that for women struggling to survive in the face of the most terrible abuses, a
post-modern critique of rights may seem rather beside the point. However
subtle and intellectually sound, it is apt to seem a luxury best left for that far off
day when secret police no longer pound on the door in the middle of the night,
traffickers no longer come round to purchase girls from their fathers and sell
the:m into slavery a thousand miles a way, and paramilitary forces no longer
operate rape camps in the center of town. Rights-talk, for all its flaws, offers a
powerful way to understand the world. Rights-based narratives are not the only
powerful narratives-and in some cultural contexts they may be much less
effective than in others-but for many of the world's women, they offer the
best way to buttress arguments for change. Put another way, there are times, as
Gayatri Spivak has said, when a certain "strategic essentialism" is not a bad
idea. 36
Of course, we should never let short-term strategic concerns push us into
damaging over-simplifications or prevent us from thinking in more long-term,
complex or even utopian ways. So I do not at all mean to suggest that the
second phase, post-modem feminist critique of human rights discourse is either
pointless or wrongheaded. What I do want to do is suggest that for all the
undoubted force of that critique, we should not, as feminist activists, be too
quick to conclude that the universalist human rights discourse is fatally flawed,
and worthy only of quick abandonment.
Consider a brief and utopian thought experiment: if human rights-oriented
feminists had been in charge of developing the U.S. policy response after
September 11, would anything be different today? I think so. Feminist
thinkers have traditionally valued attentiveness to nuance; if feminists ran the
world, perhaps we would have responded to September 11 not just (or not at
all) through military action but through programs that acknowledge the
economic and political desperation felt by so many of the world's
disenfranchised, since it is that desperation that helps fuel misdirected acts of
terrorist violence.
Intense poverty and the absence of democratic
government-that is, the absence of many basic human rights-create a fertile
breeding and recruiting ground for terrorists. What's more, the intensive
military response in Afghanistan was devastating to Afghan civilians, 37 and
women civilians are particularly vulnerable in times of conflict. Feminist
policy-makers might have looked harder for ways to target AI Qaeda without so
much devastation to Afghan civilians.

36. Gayatri Spivak, Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography, in THE SPIVAK READER:
SELECTED WORKS OF GAY ATRI SPIVAK (Donna Landry & Gerald MacLean, eds., 1995).
37. See. e.g., Dexter Filkins, Flaws in U.S. Air War Left Hundreds of Civilians Dead, N.Y. TiMES,
July 21, 2002, at A I.
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Feminist, rights-oriented policy makers would also insist, in the wake of
September 11, that regimes and cultures which systematically exclude or
oppress women must change if they are to be our allies. In parts of the Islamic
world, women are systematically shut out from formal political participation
and indeed from political discourse. In these settings, it should be little surprise
if the resulting political discourse is violent and impoverished. I do not mean,
here, to suggest that women would "by nature" bring a more pacifistic view of
things to the table. I do mean, however, that any political discourse premised
on the exclusion and subjection of half the adult population will inevitably be
narrower and more violent.
For that matter, with regard to the Taliban regime, which harbored or
colluded with AI Qaeda, we might note that had feminist human rights lawyers
been in charge, the Taliban would have been sanctioned and challenged and
possibly even ejected a long time ago. After all, long before George W. Bush
declared the Taliban to be supporters of terrorism, feminist rights advocates
were drawing attention to the Taliban's brutal discrimination against women.
Sadly, even in post-Taliban Afghanistan, women continue to suffer
disproportionately: Rule by the UN-sanctioned group ofwarlords who replaced
the Taliban means that women in much of Afghanistan remain at risk of sexual
violence, excluded from public life, and at risk of retaliation if they throw off
the burqa. 38 Feminist policy-makers would have been less quick to assume that
just because pre-war Afghanistan was run by male warlords with appalling
human rights records, so too post-war Afghanistan had to be run by the same
cast of characters. Feminists would have rejected that oft-made assertion that
these warlords had popular "legitimacy" and therefore should form the core of
a post-conflict transition government. How much "legitimacy" can there be for
leaders whose claim to power rests on force, in a context in which half the
population was systematically denied access to public goods? 39
This thought experiment is unabashedly utopian. In real life, feminist
rights advocates were few and far between in the Bush administration as it
sought a response to the tragic events of September 11. But this thought
experiment suggests how different the world might be if enough people took
seriously feminist approaches to international issues. Even in the far-fromutopian world we live in, feminist and rights-based arguments did make a
difference in the United States response to September 11-not nearly as much
difference as many would wish, to be sure, but some difference. If feminist
rights advocates had not done so much important work documenting the
Taliban's oppression of women, the U.S. would probably have made no effort

38. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 30.
39. Imagine, if South Africa's transition from Apartheid had been managed by the U.N., what an
outcry there would have been if the vast majority of potential leaders invited by the U.N. to determine
the future leadership of the country had been white!
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at all to include women in Afghanistan's post-Taliban government. As it
stands, at least a few women were included, and United States and other
international funds have now been made available for aid and educational
programs directed toward women.
What's more, for a brief moment,
Americans saw President Bush and First Lady Laura Bush on television,
decrying gender discrimination under the Taliban. This helped opened up new
space in the political discourse to raise questions about the United States
coziness with Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern regimes that discriminate
against women, and it also helped buttress the effort in support of Senate
ratification of CEDA W.
These examples in tum point to some ways in which the universalist
international human rights discourse can offer something to American
feminists, even those who have made ·domestic U.S. affairs their priority. The
international human rights discourse can, in some very practical ways, offer
American feminists some new ways to conceptualize-and perhaps remedysome old problems.
Let me give a concrete example: the Violence Against Women Act
(VA WA) represented a federal attempt to protect women from domestic
violence, since states have, on the whole, done such a lackluster job. We could
defend the constitutionality of VA WA on many traditional grounds, but
international human rights law offers us a new and potentially powerful way to
argue for VA W A's constitutionality. As a number of feminist international law
scholars argued in an amicus brief filed before the Supreme Court, both
customary international law and the international human rights covenants give
women the right to be free of gender-based violence. Since the U.S. is a party
to several of these international human rights covenants, the federal
government is arguably permitted-and, indeed, arguably required-to enact
legislation to protect women from domestic violence to the extent that it is
gender-based. Since international law is part of the law of the United States,
and the Constitution empowers Congress to pass laws detining and punishing
offenses under the law of nations, there is no constitutional impediment to
VAWA. 40
Ultimately, neither this argument nor any of the more traditional
constitutional arguments succeeded in persuading the Supreme Court to uphold
VA WA, and the international law argument got not a single mention in the
Court's May 15 opinion. Nonetheless, the international law argument was, in
my view, both novel and legally persuasive. Its novelty may have doomed it
with a Court unaccustomed to international human rights law arguments-but
as I write, the Senate seems poised to ratify the Convention on the Elimination

40. See Brief of Amici Curiae International Law Scholars and Human Rights Experts in Support of
Petitioners, Brzonkala v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-0005, 99-0029).
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of Discrimination Against Women (CEDA W); 41 perhaps if CEDA W had been
ratified at the time the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of
VA W A, the outcome would have been a little different.
Perhaps even if CEDA W had been ratified, the Court would have drawn
the same conclusions; but with the passage of time, I think international human
rights-based arguments will find an increasingly sympathetic audience in U.S.
courts and policy fora. 42 Today, more and more law schools are offering
human rights law classes and integrating the teaching of human rights law into
the mainstream curriculum; more and more programs such as Yale's Global
Constitutionalism Project are being designed; more and more A.B.A. and
Aspen Institute programs are educating judges and lawyers about the law
beyond our own borders, and more and more judges and practitioners are
beginning to think creatively about connecting the domestic and the
international.
International human rights law arguments are becoming
increasingly common in both federal and state courts, and the integration of
international human rights norms into U.S. legal and political discourse is
likely to accelerate.
Thus, in a very pragmatic sense, international human rights law, however
problematic, offers new ways to approach old legal dilemmas-and in the years
to come, I believe that international human rights law arguments will become
43
both much more familiar and more persuasive to American courts.
There is another level, too, on which the universalist international human
rights discourse holds tremendous promise for us as American feminists. I
grew up in a feminist household, and have defined myself as a feminist since I
was old enough to pronounce the word. As someone who believes that the
feminist project is far from over, it has saddened me, over the years, to watch
many women in my own age cohort turn their backs on the feminist label.
We've all seen this: the young women who inform us that they are "postfeminist," or who are reluctant to argue for women's rights without prefacing
their arguments with, "Well, I'm not a feminist, but .... " For reasons that are
complicated-reasons that have something to do with our own failure to reach

41. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the treaty on July 30, 2002. Press Release,
Amnesty International, Amnesty International Applauds Senate Committee Passage of Treaty on the
Rights of Women (July 30, 2002).
42. This trend too has in some ways been accelerated by September II. The post-September II
political environment has created short-term threats to civil liberties, but at the same time it has further
opened the door to internationalist arguments. Consider the Bush administration's proposed military
tribunals: negative reactions to the proposed tribunals by close U.S. allies, and human rights-based
refusals to extradite suspects to the U.S., forced the administration to make significant compromises.
While September II accelerated a willingness to "go it alone" in some quarters of the U.S. government,
in many other quarters it forced a new awareness of the importance of multilateral cooperation. It is too
soon to say what the long-term impact of September II will be on U.S. foreign policy, and on U.S.
willingness to incorporate international human rights concerns into domestic policy-but
unquestionably, an opportunity now exists that did not exist to the same extent a few years ago.
43. Another example might be the death penalty.
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out and communicate, and have quite a lot to do with a well-organized and
well-funded anti-feminist backlash-many young women find the feminist
discourse alarming, or unintelligible, or irrelevant, or alienating, or all of the
above. And this, I think, is a tragedy for all women, for there is so much that
remains to be done: As one of my favorite tee-shirt slogans has it, 'Til be a
post-feminist in a post-patriarchy."
How can we bring these disaffected women back into the feminist fold? It
seems to me that the universalist international human rights discourse offers us
a way to reach out to the generation of women who see feminism as passe-no
doubt useful back in the dark days of the seventies, but at this point somewhat
embarrassing and outre.
Just as an international human rights law perspective allows us a new and
different way to argue for the constitutionality of VA WA, so international
human rights law offers us a new lens for looking at gender inequality in the
broadest sense, and a new language for speaking and thinking about some ageold wrongs. I have seen this myself, in the classroom, as young women who
shun the "feminist" label become impassioned advocates of international
human rights, often first in the context of considering the restrictions on women
under the ousted Taliban or their only slightly less repressive successors, or
sexual trafficking, or honor killings, or female genital mutilation. These young
women often then tum back around, with their new language, their new
toolbox, to examine domestic gender issues-from domestic abuse to welfare
reform to the stubborn glass ceilings in law firms-and end up with radical
critiques of existing gender relations and law that would make their feminist
fairy godmothers proud.
In the United States, international human rights thus offers us a new
discourse, a new rhetoric, one that has already demonstrated its ability to
inspire, to provoke new intellectual insights, and to lead thousands of American
young people to embrace activist agendas. Consider the recent spate of
university-based protests over sweatshop labor or living wage ordinances, and
the protests at the IMF and World Bank. Although many of these protests have
been rightly criticized as naive, and at times incoherent, we would do well to
recognize that they represent a new phase in the evolution of American political
activism. Today's young people show little interest in the debates of the old
left, but they have a keen, if often unfocused, awareness that in this era of rapid
globalization and the omnipresent threat of terrorism, any effective advocacy
agenda must be grounded in a robust conception of international human rights.
For those who came of age politically in an earlier era, this represents both
a challenge and a tremendous opportunity. Internationalist, universalist rightstalk is not the only narrative in town, and as Margaret Radin has observed,
there is no reason to insist on its primacy at all times: We can make "situated
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judgments" about when rights-talk is useful and when it is not. 44 But at a
moment in time when left wing politics, feminism, and liberalism are all
floundering, unable any longer to persuade or inspire a new generation that
worries about wars and jobs and the environment, the discourse of international
human rights offers us a new and potentially transformative way to
conceptualize the world's many injustices. As feminist scholars, judges, and
lawyers, this is an opportunity we cannot afford to pass up.

44. Margaret Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist. 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699, 1718-19 ( 1990).

